芯片戰爭的秘密：詳細報告

[石爺 (MJTVHoPin)]

Clues to the U.S.-Dutch-Japanese Semiconductor Export Controls Deal Are Hiding in Plain Sight

Photo: MANDEL NGAN/AFP/Getty Images

Report by Gregory C. Allen and Emily Benson

Published March 1, 2023

On October 7, 2022, the Biden administration upended more than two decades of U.S. trade policy toward China when it issued sweeping new regulations on U.S. exports to China of advanced artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductor technology. These export controls were designed after consultation with key U.S. allies, but the United States originally implemented them unilaterally.

This was a major diplomatic gamble.

In the face of rapidly advancing Chinese AI and semiconductor capabilities, the United States wanted to move fast, so it was willing to take the risk of moving first alone. The United States has the strongest overall position in the global semiconductor industry, and it was by itself strong enough to reshape the Chinese semiconductor industry in the short term. Over the medium to long term, however, this move could have backfired disastrously if other countries, particularly Japan and the Netherlands, moved to fill the gaps in the Chinese market that the partial U.S. exit left.

But that is not going to happen. In late January 2023, the Biden administration’s gamble paid off when the United States secured a deal with both the Netherlands and Japan to join in the new semiconductor export controls. Some officials suggested to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that the result of the dialogues is better characterized as an “understanding” rather than a formal deal, as some details have yet to be worked out. Regardless, the United States has secured the top three international partners needed to ensure the policy’s success. Taiwan had already made a public announcement that it would support enforcement of the October 7 regulation’s application of the U.S. Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule.

However, the exact contours of the deal with the Netherlands and Japan are not yet publicly known. China has aggressively usedtrade restrictions in the past as a coercive and punitive tool of foreign policy, and all parties to the deal remain tight-lipped, likely in the hopes that this will diminish China’s appetite for retaliation. No doubt the White House would love to have had a big photo-op signing ceremony to show how its gamble on allied diplomacy paid off, but the Biden administration has remained remarkably leak-proof on the topic. The lack of leaks is happening for the same reason the administration was able to pull the deal off: they take allies’ concerns—including a desire for secrecy—seriously.

Thus, journalists and semiconductor companies have struggled in vain over the past few weeks to gain clarity on the elements of the deal. The full details are unlikely to be known until the Dutch and Japanese governments publish their updated export controls regulations, which will take months. In the case of Dutch export controls, some types of policy changes might never be published at all, such as changing the policy for reviewing certain types of export license applications from “case by case” to “presumption of denial.”

In the meantime, however, there are plenty of clues to the deal’s contents from a careful analysis of three elements: (1) the role that Dutch and Japanese companies play in the global semiconductor value chain, (2) the revealed policy preferences of the Biden administration based on the content of the October 7 regulations, and (3) the nature of the underlying legal authorities that constitute the Dutch export controls system. This paper addresses each in turn.

The Role of Dutch and Japanese Companies in the Global Semiconductor Value Chain

The semiconductor value chain includes three major segments: chip design, fabrication (i.e., chip wafer manufacturing), and assembly and testing. See Figure 1 for a simplified depiction.

Image

The United States has the strongest overall position in the global semiconductor industry, but that is as a leader of a deeply interwoven multinational value chain in which other countries also play critical roles and possess technological capabilities that are extremely difficult to replace. The October 7 export controls restricted U.S. sales across multiple segments of the value chain, but the lynchpin of the entire policy is the fact that U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment is an essential part of nearly every single Chinese chip factory. There are multiple categories of equipment—such as deposition, etching, and process control—in which U.S. companies are either exclusive or dominant suppliers, and China’s domestic semiconductor equipment industry is tiny and generally far behind that of the United States. The regulations identified 11 specific types of advanced semiconductor equipment (equipment that is only used for producing advanced chips) where there is no foreign substitute for U.S. technology. Some of these equipment types are among the most complicated and precise machines used anywhere in the global economy. Each represents an extremely tall technology mountain that China must climb to reach its goal of a self-sufficient semiconductor industry.

The United States moved first for two reasons: First, to move fast. Chinese chip companies were purchasing equipment as quickly as they could in anticipation of future export controls. Second, the United States wanted to prove that it was not going to ask allies to bear any costs that it was unwilling to bear itself. The long-term success of the policy required multilateral cooperation, most urgently from the Netherlands and Japan.

The Biden administration correctly assessed that the United States was, by itself, strong enough to reshape the Chinese semiconductor industry in the short term. However, Dutch and Japanese companies possess advanced technological capabilities in highly related disciplines. Whereas it would have likely taken China, by itself, decades to replace the equipment that the United States is no longer willing to sell, assistance from the Netherlands or Japan could have had China back up and running in as little as a year or two.

The global semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry has seen ever-increasing market consolidation as the cost and complexity of remaining competitive at the state of the art has soared. For the equipment categories in which the United States is dominant, Dutch and Japanese companies have increasingly found head-to-head competition with U.S. firms unattractive. It would have taken Dutch and Japanese companies billions or tens of billions of dollars in research and development (R&D) costs to produce products that might capture only meager and highly unprofitable market share. However, the October 7 export controls could have changed that calculus. With U.S. companies prohibited from competing in the large and growing Chinese market, Dutch and Japanese companies might have found monopoly access to China attractive enough to justify the equipment R&D expense for new product lines to replace U.S. ones. Once successfully established in China, Dutch and Japanese companies might have been in a position to more effectively compete with and displace U.S. firms in these market niches around the world.

Whereas it would have likely taken China, by itself, decades to replace the equipment that the United States is no longer willing to sell, assistance from the Netherlands or Japan could have had China back up and running in as little as a year or two.

[石爺 (MJTVHoPin)]

This is the policy disaster that the United States had to avoid at all costs: cutting off a key revenue source for U.S. companies, creating stronger international competitors to U.S. tech leadership, and having almost nothing to show for it in terms of affecting China’s military technology trajectory.

But that is not the only thing that the United States wanted from the Netherlands and Japan in negotiations. Dutch and Japanese companies dominate additional categories of semiconductor manufacturing equipment that U.S. companies do not. In particular, they dominate the production of lithography equipment, the most advanced types of which rival the James Webb Space Telescope or Large Hadron Collider in terms of technological precision and complexity. In January 2021, the think tank Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) published a report on the global semiconductor value chain that argued:

The Netherlands, Japan, and a small number of other countries are the dominant producers of lithography equipment, critical for the production of chips and photomasks. China cannot produce any advanced lithography equipment. Most importantly, the Netherlands and Japan are exclusive providers of advanced photolithography equipment—especially extreme ultraviolet (EUV) scanners and secondarily argon fluoride (ArF) immersion scanners—necessary for mass-production of advanced chips, representing China’s top chokepoint.

In other words, the United States maintains control of strong chokepoints for blocking China’s access to the future of AI and semiconductor technology, but the Dutch and Japanese chokepoints are even stronger.

Combined, these facts suggest two primary goals that the United States sought in its deal with the Netherlands and Japan: (1) an agreement to prohibit Dutch and Japanese companies from backfilling the categories of semiconductor manufacturing equipment that the United States is no longer selling to China, and (2) an agreement to prohibit the Dutch and Japanese from exporting their advanced lithography equipment to China.

Dutch companies are the world leaders in lithography steppers and scanners, which produce and refract the light that passes through a photomask (a transparent plate that contains the desired circuit pattern) to transfer that pattern to the silicon wafer. Japanese companies are the other major producers of steppers and scanners. In 2019, the two countries combined enjoyed more than 99 percent worldwide market share. Japan is also dominant in resist processing tools and electron beam lithography tools, which are critical for producing photomasks. Beyond lithography, there are other categories of semiconductor manufacturing equipment where Dutch and Japanese companies are also dominant—Japan in silicon wafer crystal machining equipment, for example—and Japan also excels in the production of the ultra-precise materials and ultra-pure chemicals that are used for semiconductor manufacturing.

At least some of these other semiconductor technology categories were likely included in the deal. However, lithography equipment—including steppers and scanners, electron-beam tools, and resist processing tools—is the most important foreign technology dependence in the Chinese semiconductor industry, and sources with knowledge of the deal have confirmed to CSIS that restricting exports of advanced lithography equipment to China was included in the deal. As was an agreement to prevent backfilling of U.S. equipment.

[石爺 (MJTVHoPin)]

But knowing that these are the categories of items to control does not answer how they will be controlled. For that, a closer look is needed at how the October 7 policy is designed and what that suggests about the desired U.S. approach.

The Revealed Policy Preferences of the Biden Administration in the October 7 Regulations

The publication of the October 7 regulations included a supplementary information section that detailed the rationale and justification for the regulations. In general, however, these justifications are geared toward explaining how the government’s actions are consistent with the legal authorities that it possesses. In particular, the justifications go into great detail to explain the connection between exports of semiconductor technology to China and China’s nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced missile programs. This is important because many export controls authorities for both the United States and other countries apply only in cases of counter-WMD efforts, which the paper will return to again later.

However, the October 7 document deserves further discussion beyond the explicit justification. The U.S. government’s actions themselves are an important clue to what the United States desires and how it assesses the likely interplay of certain policy mechanisms and market forces. The U.S. approach reveals a great deal about what U.S. policymakers want and, therefore, presumably what they would have asked for from the Dutch and Japanese governments.

In the context of semiconductor equipment manufacturing, the Biden administration used multiple tools from its export controls policy toolbox. It also created other policy tools, such as new types of FDP rules, by drawing upon legal authorities and flexibilities granted to the U.S. Department of Commerce by the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 and earlier legislation. A previous CSIS paper, “Choking Off China’s Access to the Future of AI” goes into significantly greater detail on the various elements of the policy. This paper will focus only on the elements related to chip wafer fabrication and semiconductor manufacturing equipment since these are the two that matter most in the context of the U.S. agreement with the Netherlands and Japan.

In short, the October 7 regulations are designed to restrict China’s ability to manufacture semiconductors above certain technology performance thresholds, which in the semiconductor industry are commonly referred to as a “technology node.” These performance thresholds are segmented by the three major categories of chips, all aligned at the same technology node. They are:

• logic chips: FinFET or superior, which corresponds to 16 nanometers (nm) or lower technology nodes;
• short-term memory (DRAM): 18 nm or lower; and
• long-term memory (NAND): 128 layers or higher.

The October 7 regulations created a new Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) on the Commerce Control List, ECCN 3B090, which details 11 different types of semiconductor manufacturing equipment that are exclusively relevant to producing chips at this technology node or better. This paper refers to these categories of equipment as “advanced node equipment.” Then, there is a much longer list of equipment that is potentially useful for producing chips equal to or better than the previously mentioned performance thresholds but that are also often used to produce older chips. This paper refers to these categories of equipment as “node-agnostic equipment.”

The October 7 regulations require an export license for selling advanced node equipment to any end-users in China, but the policy also states that license applications will be reviewed differently depending on the location of the end-user company headquarters (e.g., China).

The U.S. Department of Commerce will review license applications for U.S. exports of advanced node equipment to companies that are headquartered in China (Chinese companies) with a “presumption of denial,” which is de facto a ban. However, license applications for sales of advanced equipment to company facilities that are operating in China but are owned by non-Chinese companies headquartered in a country on the Commerce Export Administration Regulations (EAR) A:5 or A:6 list will be reviewed on a “case-by-case basis,” depending upon “factors including technology level, customers and compliance plans.”

Thus, Chinese-owned companies are prohibited from buying advanced equipment, but companies headquartered in more trusted countries (the A:5 and A:6 lists) will likely still be able to buy advanced equipment for their production facilities in China. Shortly after October 7, the U.S. Department of Commerce granted one-year authorizations to Taiwanese and South Korean companies to allow them to continue purchasing U.S. advanced node and node-agnostic equipment for their advanced semiconductor manufacturing facilities in China. During a speech at CSIS on February 23, Undersecretary of Commerce Alan Estevez stated that “We’re working with those companies on the way forward there. So, what it’ll likely be is a cap on the levels that they can grow to in China . . . If you’re at whatever layer of NAND we’ll stop it somewhere at that range. It will depend on what the Chinese are doing too, but we are in deep dialogue with the companies around that.”

[石爺 (MJTVHoPin)]

Exports of node-agnostic semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China are restricted only under end-use control. Even after October 7, there is no export license requirement for node-agnostic equipment sales to facilities in China unless that facility is producing chips equal to or better than the previously mentioned performance thresholds, which is the relevant end-use. In such cases, all equipment sales, whether advanced node or node-agnostic, are subject to a presumption of denial. For example, SMIC, the most advanced Chinese logic chip manufacturer, has some facilities that, in 2022, achieved mass production of 14 nm logic chips. SMIC also has many other facilities that produce at older technology nodes, such as 28 nm and 55 nm. The SMIC 14 nm facilities face a presumption of denial on purchases of both advanced node equipment and node-agnostic equipment. SMIC’s 28 nm facilities will be allowed to purchase the node-agnostic equipment, as well as legacy node equipment, but not the advanced equipment.

The same export restrictions that apply to the sale of equipment also apply to the provision of equipment components as well as expertise and advice. If the United States does not want China to be able to buy advanced semiconductor equipment, it only makes sense that they would also not want China to be able to buy all the constituent components that could be assembled into such equipment. Nor would they want to allow U.S. consulting companies and experts to teach China how to build such equipment.

As stated above, the approach that the United States has taken reveals a great deal about what U.S. policymakers want and what they think is required to succeed. The U.S. policy is designed to halt Chinese-owned production of advanced chips but also to provide more flexibility in decisions related to foreign-owned production of advanced chips in China. The United States also wants to continue allowing China to produce less advanced chips but only to Chinese companies that clearly give up on the goal of producing advanced chips.

It is a safe assumption, therefore, that the United States asked the Netherlands and Japan to adopt rules that pursue the same goals but also reflect the different technological niches that each country occupies in the semiconductor value chain. This leads naturally to the question of what types of lithography equipment are sufficiently advanced to allow for producing chips at the performance levels covered by the October 7 thresholds. The five different types of lithography technology relevant to the question, in order of most advanced to least advanced, are:

• extreme ultraviolet (EUV);
• argon fluoride immersion (ArF immersion) deep ultraviolet (DUV) ;
• argon fluoride dry (ArF dry) DUV;
• krypton fluoride (KrF) DUV; and
• I-line.

The Dutch government already stoppedgranting EUV scanner export licenses to China in 2019, so expanding the deal to include Japan and other types of EUV lithography equipment besides scanners was the easiest area on which to reach agreement in the deal.

I-line lithography, which was already in widespread use by the mid-1980s, is positively ancient by semiconductor industry standards and is, therefore, unlikely to be included in the deal. Again, the U.S. controls seek to (1) restrict sales of advanced node semiconductor manufacturing equipment to all Chinese-owned semiconductor production facilities in China and to (2) restrict sales of both advanced node and node-agnostic manufacturing equipment to Chinese semiconductor production facilities that intend to produce advanced chips (those above the aforementioned performance thresholds). I-line lithography equipment is neither advanced nor useful for producing advanced chips, and thus it is irrelevant to both U.S. goals. There is little reason to restrict its export to China.

That leaves the three types of DUV lithography—ArF immersion, ArF dry, and KrF—as the possible places to draw the line. In commercial usage, KrF dates back to the late 1980s, ArF dry dates to the late 1990s, and ArF immersion dates to the mid-2000s. However, new and improved versions of all three types of DUV lithography machines continue to attract commercial customers due to their lower costs and reduced operational complexity. They are especially attractive to fab operators in China, where massive government subsidies allow Chinese companies to focus more on growing market share in legacy chip production than achieving unsubsidized commercial profitability.

The most advanced Chinese lithography company, Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment group (SMEE), currently markets systems using ArF dry and KrF technology. This is important because the risk of foreign substitution is a key criterion for export controls decisions. However, SMEE’s most advanced ArF dry lithography machines are in the prototype stage and have not yet achieved the affordability, reliability, and performance required to be marketed commercially. On every metric that matters, they are dramatically inferior to Dutch and Japanese alternatives. Moreover, SMEE DUV scanners are more than a decade and a half behind the state of the art in the Netherlands and Japan in terms of the types of chips that they can produce. Of note, in December 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce added SMEE to the Entity List “for acquiring and attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items in support of China’s military modernization.” This action is consistent with the overall approach of the October 7 regulations and was likely a helpful step for securing Dutch and Japanese buy-in. SMEE will struggle more than it already has with reduced access to foreign lithography technology components—such as light sources, mirrors, and laser amplifiers—and expertise.

[石爺 (MJTVHoPin)]

In its 2021 final report, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) included a recommendation that directly pertains to both the logic behind the October 7 policy and the resulting negotiations with the Netherlands and Japan. It is worth quoting at length:

[The United States Government should] work with the governments of the Netherlands and Japan to align the export licensing processes of all three countries regarding high-end SME [semiconductor manufacturing equipment], particularly EUV and ArF Immersion lithography equipment, toward a policy of presumptive denial of licenses for exports of such equipment to China. This would slow China’s efforts to domestically produce 7nm or 5nm chips at scale and constrain China’s semiconductor production capability of chips at any node at or below 16nm—which the Commission assesses to be most useful for advanced AI applications—by limiting the capability of Chinese firms to repair or replace existing equipment.

The October 7 policy targeted the 16 nm technology node (FinFET), and the NSCAI concluded that the right lithography technologies to apply export controls to prevent China from producing 16 nm or better chips were EUV and ArF immersion. EUV and ArF immersion are also the lithography technologies that the aforementioned CSET report identified in 2021 as “China’s top chokepoint.” Combined, this strongly suggests that the agreement between the United States, the Netherlands, and Japan drew the performance threshold line to restrict sales of EUV and ArF immersion lithography equipment, related components, and possibly expertise to China. An examination of Dutch export controls law provides even further evidence for this conclusion.

The Legal Authorities underlying the Dutch Export Control System

As mentioned previously, the U.S. Congress had already passed multiple laws updating the process for making export controls and giving additional legal flexibilities and authorities to the executive branch to issue new export controls regulations. Naturally, a deal with the Netherlands and Japan would be much more difficult to achieve if it required their governments to pass new laws to implement the agreement. While ASML, the leading Dutch lithography company, has stated that it believes that the Dutch parliament will have to pass new laws to implement the agreement, the Dutch and Japanese governments have not indicated that new laws are required. Thus, a careful examination of the existing legal authorities available for export controls, in particular for the Netherlands, provides significant relevant information for inferring the content of the agreement.

Combined, this strongly suggests that the agreement between the United States, the Netherlands, and Japan drew the performance threshold line to restrict sales of EUV and ArF immersion lithography equipment, related components, and possibly expertise to China.

In an interview with CSIS, Sebastiaan Benninkof BenninkAmar Advocaten, a Dutch law firm that specializes in economic sanctions, export controls, and trade law, explained that there are three potential sources of legal authority for the Dutch government to regulate the export of dual-use goods and services (i.e., commercial items with both civilian and military applications):

1. the Wassenaar Arrangement;
2. European Union dual-use export controls regulations; and
3. Dutch legislation passed by parliament.

The Wassenaar Arrangement: Created after the end of the Cold War, the Wassenaar Arrangement is the most important multilateral export controls framework. It establishes the process for updating the List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions. Each of the member states agrees to apply an export controls licensing process to all of the listed technologies and also to exchange information regarding the export of such items. The United States, Japan, and the Netherlands are all participating states.

Critically, the Wassenaar Arrangement’s founding documents state that “The decision to transfer or deny transfer of any item will be the sole responsibility of each Participating State.” As a party to the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Netherlands already has a system of export licenses in place for all items on the List, and the Dutch government has both the responsibility and the authority to make decisions about whether license applications will be reviewed with a “presumption of denial.”

Lithography scanner and stepper equipment are included on the Wassenaar list when the equipment has “a. A light source wavelength shorter than 193 nm; or b. Capable of producing a pattern with a ‘Minimum Resolvable Feature size’ (MRF) of 45 nm or less.” Both ArF dry and ArF immersion use a 193-nm light source (i.e., equal to but not shorter than 193 nm), so that criterion would only allow restrictions of EUV lithography tools. The MRF criterion achieves the same result. Dylan Patel of SemiAnalysis has argued that ArF immersion, ArF dry, and even some types of KrF lithography machines are capable of producing patterns with an MRF size of less than 45 nm, but only by using multiple patterning techniques. This might be true in theory, but in practice, it would be extremely difficult to exclusively use legacy equipment to produce advanced chips with competitive quantity, quality, and price to be commercially relevant. Regardless, the equation that the Wassenaar list requires governments to use when calculating MRF does not take into account the effects of multiple patterning.

[石爺 (MJTVHoPin)]

Thus, the Dutch government’s authority under the Wassenaar Arrangement gives it the flexibility only to restrict the exports of EUV lithography equipment, which it was already controlling prior to the October 7 rules. Updating Wassenaar rules requires consensus among all member countries. Russia, a Wassenaar member that has been extensively targeted with technology export controls following its invasion of Ukraine, has made clear that it will veto any proposed reforms to the existing Wassenaar list. The recent deal between the Netherlands and the United States must, therefore, have gone beyond Wassenaar and beyond EUV.

European Union Dual-Use Export Controls Regulations: The Netherlands has aligned its laws and regulations on export controls with those of the European Union. However, the European Union not only requires an export license but can also specify that certain types of exports are prohibited. In practice, such EU export controls regulations must be imposed by the European Council and can only be instantiated with the unanimous consent of all EU member countries, which is difficult to achieve. The EU response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was one of the rare instances in which new export controls were imposed on a unanimous basis.

For the most part, the lists of EU export-controlled goods and services conform to those of the Wassenaar Arrangement, and this is indeed the case for lithography equipment. However, Article 4 of the European Union’s export controls regulations(EC No 2021/821) grants individual member states the independent authority to require a license for items other than those on the EU lists in certain cases. One of those is cases in which:

[. . .] the items in question are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for use in connection with the development, production, handling, operation, maintenance, storage, detection, identification or dissemination of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or the development, production, maintenance or storage of missiles capable of delivering such weapons.

The October 7 regulation justifications included significant analysis of the connection between exports of advanced computer chips and other semiconductor technologies and the military supercomputers that China uses to develop nuclear weapons and advanced nuclear missile delivery systems, such as hypersonics. This is undoubtedly true and does not require the capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community to prove; journalists at the Wall Street Journal independently reviewedChinese government procurement documents and reached the same conclusion. Moreover, when the U.S. government builds advanced supercomputers, it freely acknowledges that simulating nuclear explosions and hypersonics modeling are among their most important tasks.

Thus, the United States was not misleading or exaggerating when it said that the technologies being export controlled were directly related to China’s supercomputers as part of China’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. Loudly and repeatedly emphasizing this point, however, served an additional purpose: reminding the Dutch government that they were within their rights to invoke Article 4.

If Article 4 criteria apply, it means the Dutch prime minister and the Dutch cabinet (specifically the ministers of foreign affairs and foreign trade) can implement new export controls license requirements and a policy of “presumption of denial” for certain types of goods without requesting a vote by either the European Council or the Dutch parliament. Given the relatively thin majority of the current ruling Dutch political coalition, this is a significant convenience.

This is not to say that the Dutch will not ultimately seek to Europeanize the controls. Mathieu Duchâtel of the Institut Montaigne has argued persuasively that the Dutch should and will do so, both to reduce the risk of Chinese retaliation and to build cohesion between the European members of the Dutch semiconductor equipment supply chain. Regarding the latter point, there is some cause for optimism. Partly as a result of the tremendous U.S. response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and U.S. efforts to align technology policy with the European Union, Dutch and wider European confidence in the United States is growing alongside increased wariness of China. In a February 2023 op-ed, Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte wrote, “I cannot see how this will be China’s century. The 21st century will be the century of democracy and thus the century of America.” Similarly, during a recent speech at CSIS, EU commissioner Thierry Breton gave a speech in which he said: “We cannot allow China to access the most advanced technologies, be they in semiconductors, quantum, cloud, edge, AI, connectivity, and so on. I see a very strong alignment on this agenda between the EU and the U.S., even if we may sometimes differ on the methods, which is normal.”

Some German think tank scholars, including Tobias Hehrke and Julian Ringhof of the European Council on Foreign Relations, have argued that the European Union must update its strategic approach to export controls in the wake of the October 7 policy. Even Germany’s government, which has historically been cautious about strengthening restrictions on technology trade with China, recently blocked the acquisition of a Chinese takeover of a German semiconductor fab. Future geopolitical developments could accelerate the U.S., EU, and Japanese semiconductor export controls alignment. In mid-February, U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken warned that China was considering providing “lethal support” to Russia’s military. Given the speed and strength of the European Union’s export controls reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, such a move by China would no doubt cause a dramatic reassessment of the European relationship with China, including on technology export controls.

The desire to ultimately bring Europe into the new semiconductor export controls framework is a reason in favor of drawing the line at ArF immersion lithography technology, rather than ArF dry or KrF. Given that the vast majority of Chinese domestic semiconductor production facilities are producing chips at older technology process nodes, restricting ArF immersion is primarily about choking off China’s access to future technological progress in AI and semiconductors, redirecting Chinese semiconductor production capacity growth toward older technology nodes, and redirecting advanced production capacity growth to countries outside of China. In that regard, the United States, Japan, Europe, South Korea, and Taiwan have all signaled a desire to significantly increase government support of semiconductor production investments. If the policy and diplomatic stars align, this could even mean that U.S. and allied semiconductor equipment producers need not face an overall reduction in sales from the October 7 regulations and their foreign equivalents—merely a geographic customer realignment. This favorable outcome would require more than a few strokes of luck, but the possibility exists. Regardless, there is a strong reason for the major allied powers in semiconductors to align their investment strategies to avoid duplication and unprofitable overcapacity in key segments. Aligning export controls is basically a pre-requisite to aligning investments, and that increases the chance that the major semiconductor powers will do so.

[石爺 (MJTVHoPin)]

Summary and Conclusion

In sum, the U.S. deal with Japan and the Netherlands included assurances that Japan and the Netherlands will not allow their semiconductor manufacturing equipment companies to sell to China the categories of equipment that the United States is now prohibiting. The agreement also included assurances that the Dutch and Japanese governments will prohibit the sale of lithography equipment—steppers and scanners, electron-beam tools, and resist processing tools—most likely at advanced performance levels consistent with EUV and argon fluoride immersion technology. The agreement also likely covered the export of related technology components that are used in the production of such lithography equipment and may have even restricted consulting services for transferring knowledge related to such machines, though this is more speculative. Finally, the agreement may have also prohibited the sale of a much broader set of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, as well as materials and chemicals, in cases where these represent genuine market chokepoints. In all cases, such restrictions in the Netherlands and Japan will likely follow the U.S. approach of treating export license applications differently depending on whether the chip production facilities in China are Chinese-owned or foreign-owned, as well as the degree of technological advancement at the production facility.

Even though many details remain unclear at this stage and will likely require continued diplomatic engagement to iron out, the semiconductor export controls agreement between the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands is a major diplomatic achievement for all three countries. Furthermore, if the countries can implement and enforce an agreement, that achievement alone would advance the formation of a new plurilateral export controls regime on semiconductors. This, in turn, begs questions about the long-term suitability of the Wassenaar Arrangement for housing these types of sensitive dual-use diplomatic agreements.

Even though many details remain unclear at this stage and will likely require continued diplomatic engagement to iron out, the semiconductor export controls agreement between the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands is a major diplomatic achievement for all three countries.

The work is not done, however. Germany is a leader in the production of key components that make up semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and South Korea is both a leader in chip manufacturing and a small but sophisticated producer of manufacturing equipment. Both Germany and South Korea need to join the new export controls agreement in order to prevent the fracturing of the U.S.-led global semiconductor value chain. If possible, it would be best if the entire European Union were to join. None of this will be easy or quick, but the trilateral deal has bought years of time and demonstrated to others that the United States will work to protect the interests of those that join it in promoting international peace and security.

Gregory C. Allen is the director of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Governance Project and a senior fellow in the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Emily Benson is a senior fellow with the CSIS Scholl Chair in International Business in Washington, D.C.

This report is made possible by general support to CSIS and the Smith Richardson Foundation.

---

This report is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2023 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

---

Tags

Asia , China , Europe , Japan , Technology , Economics, Global Economic Governance , Trade and International Business , and Artificial Intelligence

[叶青]

文章中提到“ It would have taken Dutch and Japanese companies billions or tens of billions of dollars in research and development (R&D) costs to produce products that might capture only meager and highly unprofitable market share. ”当初日本与荷兰愿意引进美国技术而不是自己承担成本与市场风险。

实际上当时中国也是同样的逻辑。中国很早就有要发展自己的芯片制造能力的意愿，但是在广泛讨论中，另一派的声音占据了上风，他们的理论是基于对全球化和西方商业信誉的信心之上。他们认为国际芯片制造产业已经很成熟，如果自己闭门造车，不仅要承担巨大的科技投资成本，而且国内市场也不会轻易改变自己的采购习惯，轻易采购没有质量保证的国产芯片。所以国内芯片自主的口号一直没有被认真对待，各级政府对芯片制造的发展也限于鼓励和口号的范围。这种情况只有在近几年芯片市场上的巨变之后才发生改变。

[Fuchs]

帮着问了一下ai

问：
作为国际经济政治的博弈专家，请分析一下复杂的情况:

1.这个博弈过程中多方角色，但主要的博弈存在于A和Z之间;
2.博弈中A、B、C、D 形成某种同盟，在某项关键技术先进性上具有绝对的领先权，而Z方处于落后约10年
3.但Z方近期在这项关键技术上不断的投入，一起改变落后局面，并且不断地在该关键技术的低端产品上获得进展，在相当多的应用领域已形成低端技术自主替代其他方产品;
4.但Z方如果需要在先进领域取得进展，很大程度上依赖于abcd的技术引进，否则将面临长期的自我摸索。
5.该关键技术产品在Z方已形成巨大的市场，甚至是最大的市场，长期大批量进口ABCD的产品和服务。
6.该关键技术的高端领域具有高的产品附加值，但需要巨大的经济投入， 而这种投入又取决于低端产品销售的稳定。
7.Z方在整体经济方面是 ABCD的最大贸易伙伴, 也是ABCD地方其他产业的供应链中重最重要的一环。
8.Z方在经济实力具有很强的竞争性。

现在A方希望联合BCD方，通过政治经济等其他手段，在该关键技术方向对Z实施最大可能的限制， 以保持本方的先进性和决定性。

根据上述情况，请分析如下内容:

1. ABCD 联合限制Z的技术发展博弈方法的可行性。

2.Z方该如何改变自己在该关键技术上的弱势，突破ABCD的联合限制。

答：

就ABC联合限制Z的技术发展博弈方法的可行性而言，这种限制在短期内可能会产生一些效果，但从长远来看，这种限制很可能会带来反效果。因为Z方已经在低端领域建立了强大的市场和生产能力，如果ABCD联合限制Z的技术发展，Z方可能会加速其低端产品的技术提升和自主研发能力，以进一步巩固其市场地位。另外，如果Z方感到ABCD联合对其进行限制，它可能会开始寻找其他国家的技术合作伙伴，以减少对ABCD方的依赖，这可能会加剧ABCD与Z方之间的紧张关系，导致其他方面的贸易战争等后果。

Z方应该寻求多元化的技术合作伙伴，以降低其对ABCD方的依赖，并在高端技术领域进行更多的自主研发和投资。Z方应该通过扩大市场规模和提高产品附加值来增强其在该关键技术领域的竞争力，以便更好地与ABCD方抗衡。Z方也应该加强与ABCD方的合作，以保持市场份额和供应链优势。此外，Z方应该加强其在全球经济和贸易体系中的地位，以便更好地应对ABCD方的限制行为。

问：
请展开第1点说说

答：
针对第1点，ABC联合限制Z的技术发展博弈方法的可行性，需要考虑到以下因素：

首先，ABC联合限制Z的技术发展可能会产生短期效果，因为Z方在该关键技术上的落后地位可能会使其受到限制和压力。如果ABC方能够采取措施，如制定技术标准、增加技术转让门槛等，来限制Z方的技术发展，那么Z方可能会在一段时间内受到影响。这种限制可能会使得Z方的市场份额减少，被其他国家替代，从而影响Z方的经济发展和影响力。

然而，从长远来看，ABC联合限制Z的技术发展很可能会带来反效果。一方面，如果Z方感到被排斥或受到限制，那么它可能会更加努力地开展技术研发和创新，以寻求突破和替代方案。另一方面，Z方可能会加速其低端产品的技术提升和自主研发能力，以进一步巩固其市场地位。这种自主研发能力的提升可能会对Z方的高端技术研发和市场拓展产生积极的影响，使得Z方逐渐减少对ABCD方的依赖，并在该领域上建立更强大的竞争力。

另外，如果ABC联合限制Z的技术发展，那么Z方可能会开始寻找其他国家的技术合作伙伴，以减少对ABCD方的依赖，这可能会加剧ABCD与Z方之间的紧张关系，导致其他方面的贸易战争等后果。因此，ABC联合限制Z的技术发展可能会带来一些不可预知的风险和后果。

综上所述，ABC联合限制Z的技术发展在短期内可能会产生一定的效果，但从长远来看，这种限制可能会带来反效果。因此，在博弈中，各方需要权衡短期和长期利益，制定符合自身利益和整体利益的策略和措施。

问：
第2点展开说一下

答：
Z方可以采取以下措施来改变自身在该关键技术上的弱势，突破ABCD的联合限制：

1.加大技术研发和创新力度：Z方应加大对该关键技术的投入和研发力度，通过技术创新提高自身技术水平和竞争力，不断取得技术突破和领先优势。

2.加强与其他国家的合作：Z方可以加强与其他国家的技术合作，吸收其他国家的先进技术和经验，提高自身技术水平。同时，加强与其他国家的贸易关系，寻求新的市场和机会。

3.制定有利于自身技术发展的政策：Z方应制定有利于自身技术发展的政策，例如减税和补贴等，吸引和鼓励国内外的技术企业投入到该关键技术的研发中，促进技术创新和进步。

4.提高自身的产业链集成能力：Z方可以加强自身的产业链集成能力，通过整合上下游资源，形成完整的产业链，提高自身的产品附加值和市场竞争力。

5.加强自身的知识产权保护：Z方应加强对该关键技术的知识产权保护，保护自身的技术成果和知识产权，避免技术被侵权和盗用，提高自身的技术竞争力。

6.积极参与国际标准制定：Z方可以积极参与国际标准的制定，争取在国际标准制定过程中发挥积极的作用，保障自身的技术利益和权益。

总之，Z方需要加大技术投入和研发力度，加强国际合作，制定有利于自身技术发展的政策，提高自身的产业链集成能力和知识产权保护水平，积极参与国际标准制定，提高自身在该关键技术上的竞争力，从而突破ABCD的联合限制。

问：
在这个博弈游戏中A方应该注意什么？

答：
在这个博弈游戏中，A方应该注意以下几个方面：

确保自己的优势地位：A方应该保持自己在该关键技术上的领先地位，并不断加强自身的研发和创新能力，以确保自己不被其他方超越。

扩大合作范围：A方可以考虑与其他方合作，扩大自己在该关键技术领域的影响力，同时加强自己在该技术的标准制定方面的话语权。

注意政治因素：由于这个博弈涉及到国家之间的关系，因此A方需要密切关注政治因素对该关键技术发展的影响，并积极应对各种挑战和风险。

保持市场竞争优势：尽管Z方在低端产品市场上已经具有一定的竞争力，但A方仍应该保持自己在该领域的市场竞争优势，不断提高产品质量和性能，并寻找新的市场机会。

寻找合适的合作伙伴：A方可以寻找一些合适的合作伙伴，加强在该关键技术上的合作，共同推动技术的发展和创新，同时也可以通过合作扩大自己的市场份额和影响力。

问：
在这个博弈中Z是BCD的其他领域的最大贸易伙伴, Z同时给人显现出强烈的进取心,而BCD又是A的长期政治经济伙伴, 请设计BCD方今后十年的博弈策略

答：
针对这个复杂的博弈，BCD方需要制定出明智的博弈策略，以最大化自己的利益，同时避免冲突和负面影响。以下是一些可能的策略：

深化与Z方的经济合作：尽管BCD方在关键技术上领先于Z方，但Z方在其他领域也是BCD方的重要贸易伙伴。因此，BCD方应该继续深化与Z方的经济合作，保持贸易关系的稳定。同时，可以考虑加强技术交流和合作，共同开发新产品和技术。

加强与A方的合作：BCD方是A方的长期政治经济伙伴，两者之间有着密切的联系。因此，BCD方可以利用这种联系，与A方加强合作，在关键技术方面进行技术引进和研发，以提高自身实力。

推动技术合作：BCD方可以推动ABC三方与Z方进行技术合作，实现技术共享和相互促进。这有助于加快Z方的技术发展，同时也可以让BCD方在关键技术领域保持领先优势。

推进自主创新：尽管BCD方在关键技术上领先，但他们仍需要加强自主创新，以提高技术实力。因此，BCD方应该加强研发投入，培养科技人才，推动自主创新。

制定灵活的战略：BCD方需要制定出灵活的战略，以适应不断变化的形势。在博弈过程中，BCD方应该密切关注各方的动态，不断调整自己的策略，以最大化自己的利益。

总之，BCD方需要在保持稳定和加强合作的前提下，保持自身的技术优势和竞争力。通过技术合作、自主创新和灵活的战略，BCD方可以在博弈中获得更多的利益。

问：
因为某些特殊的原因, ABCD这个技术联盟中, C方放弃联盟关系与Z进行全面合作,会对整个博弈游戏产生什么样的影响？

答：
如果C方放弃ABC技术联盟关系与Z进行全面合作，将对整个博弈游戏产生重大影响。以下是可能的影响：

改变ABCD联盟的力量平衡：C方拥有ABC技术联盟中的技术优势，一旦离开联盟，将削弱ABC联盟的力量，削弱联盟对Z的限制能力，同时增加了Z方面对ABC联盟的潜在渗透和分化可能性，这可能使得ABC联盟在博弈中更加孤立。

增加Z的策略空间：C方与Z全面合作，Z将能够更加灵活地采取策略，例如可以选择在技术上和ABC联盟进行合作或竞争，或者在不同的技术领域上寻求不同的合作伙伴，这可能削弱ABC联盟的谈判地位和影响力。

改变BCD的政治经济关系：C方与Z进行全面合作，可能对BCD的政治经济关系产生影响。BCD是A的长期政治经济伙伴，但如果C方与Z进行全面合作，可能会削弱BCD与A的关系，这可能会增加A在博弈中的孤立，也可能导致BCD在其他领域的合作中面临风险。

综上所述，C方放弃ABC技术联盟关系与Z进行全面合作，将会影响ABC联盟的力量平衡，增加Z的策略空间，可能改变BCD的政治经济关系，需要ABC联盟和A方认真对待，制定应对策略。

问：
因为某些特殊的原因, ABCD这个技术联盟中, ABCD各方都有操作漏洞, 而这些漏洞会对Z在关键技术上的发展起到或多或少的有利作用,这种情况会对整个博弈游戏产生什么样的影响？

答：
如果ABCDEF各方都存在操作漏洞，且这些漏洞对Z在关键技术上的发展产生有力作用，那么这会对整个博弈游戏产生一定的影响。具体来说：

Z方可能会利用这些漏洞，加快其在关键技术上的发展速度，从而在该领域获得更大的市场份额。

A方可能会失去对关键技术的控制权，导致其在该领域的领先地位被Z方所取代。

B、C、D、E、F方可能会认为ABCDEF联盟无法有效地限制Z方在关键技术上的发展，从而考虑与Z方开展更密切的合作。

如果ABCDEF联盟无法有效地限制Z方在关键技术上的发展，那么这个联盟可能会面临瓦解的危险，这会给A方带来很大的损失。

因此，ABCDEF各方需要认真分析自己的操作漏洞，并采取措施加以纠正，避免这些漏洞给Z方在关键技术上的发展带来不利影响。同时，ABCDEF联盟也需要思考如何更有效地限制Z方在关键技术上的发展，保持自身在该领域的领先地位。

问：
如果Z方也采取类似手段, 限制该技术中某些关键原材料方面的出口, 而在某些关键原材上,Z方具有五年的独占权,如果发生这种情况,请预想以后十年会对整个博弈产生什么样的影响和变化

答：

如果Z方限制了某些关键原材料的出口，并且拥有五年的独占权，这将使得其他国家无法在这些关键原材料上进行竞争，而只能从Z方购买。这可能会使得Z方在博弈中取得更大的优势，因为它可以控制市场价格并获得更多的利润。此外，其他国家可能会在技术方面受到限制，因为缺乏关键原材料可能会使他们无法推动相关技术的发展。这可能会导致其他国家对Z方的依赖增加，从而增加Z方的市场份额。

在长期的博弈中，其他国家可能会开始寻找替代方案或者自行开发这些关键原材料，从而降低对Z方的依赖。此外，由于其他国家在技术上的发展受到了限制，他们可能会开始在其他领域寻找更多的合作机会，以便在其他方面取得更大的优势。因此，这种情况可能会导致博弈中的一些变化和调整，使得各国在不同的领域寻求更多的合作和竞争机会。

问：
如果Z方也采取类似手段, 限制该技术中某些关键原材料方面的出口, 而在某些关键原材上,Z方具有五年的独占权,如果发生这种情况,请预想以后十年会对整个博弈A方产生什么样的影响和变化

答：

如果Z方限制了某些关键原材料的出口并且持有五年的独占权，这将对博弈中的A方产生深远的影响和变化。A方可能会面临更高的成本和更低的生产效率，因为他们必须通过其他渠道获取所需的原材料，而这些渠道可能不够稳定和成本高昂。这可能导致A方的产品价格上涨和市场份额下降，从而损害他们在博弈中的地位和竞争力。

另一方面，A方可能会采取措施减少对Z方的依赖，例如寻找替代原材料供应商或开发新技术，以减少对Z方的依赖。这些措施可能需要额外的资金和时间投入，并且可能不一定成功，因此A方必须权衡利弊并制定相应的战略。

总的来说，Z方的限制对A方的影响将取决于A方的反应和应对措施，以及其他因素，例如市场需求和竞争环境。

问：

现在又有一个假设: 这时出现了全球经济衰弱，造成该类技术中先进工艺的高端产品出现了产品价格更高,产品成本更高 以及市场需求萎缩的情况,市场很偏向于使用Z方擅长的价格更低的中低端产品,在这样的市场变化下, 这对ABCD方和Z方这次博弈中会有什么样的影响？请分别分析优点和弱点

答:
在全球经济衰弱的情况下，该技术领域的先进工艺产品的价格更高，市场需求萎缩，而Z方擅长的价格更低的中低端产品更受市场欢迎，这会对ABCD方和Z方这次博弈产生以下影响:

对ABCD方的影响：

优点：ABCD方可以转向生产中低端产品，这样可以满足市场需求，保持竞争力，并且可能获得更高的利润。
弱点：由于ABCD方可能需要改变生产线，以生产中低端产品，这可能需要大量的投资和时间，因此需要承担较高的成本和风险。
对Z方的影响：

优点：由于Z方擅长生产价格更低的中低端产品，因此可以利用这种市场趋势增加销售额和市场份额。
弱点：Z方可能面临生产能力的限制，因为它需要满足更大的市场需求，这可能需要增加生产能力或扩大生产线，这需要大量的资本和时间。此外，由于价格更低，可能会对利润产生压力。
总体来说，这种市场变化可能会对ABCD方和Z方产生一些不利的影响，因为市场需求的萎缩会导致产品价格下降和利润减少。但是，这也可能为双方提供一些机会，因为他们可以调整他们的战略，以适应市场变化，并继续保持竞争力。

[野蜂狂舞]

文章非常有意思，狐狸先生的問題和AI的回答更有意思。

我的體會，ABCD在博弈中，雖然處於主動、優勢、上游地位，對Z短期威脅極大。可是，一旦Z扛得住最初打擊，ABCD方反而成為被動一方，成為維繫多方面複雜利益結合的困難一方，Z作為進攻一方，且顧慮更少，代價更少（初期付過了）。

[Fuchs]

谢谢,谢谢您的耐心

通过与AI的对答, 它基本上中立地把整个框架画出来, 现在各方好像都在这个框架里行事.

同意您的观点

这场博弈会是漫长的, 但这个框架很容易被外力打破, 成为更高层次博弈的手段

总之很有意思

[野蜂狂舞]

您和AI的對答，可以看到，AI的水平，是和提問正相關的，您的提問，邏輯嚴密，層次感強，引導AI思考的全面性體現出來，而我們在許多時候，發現AI的回答，和大部分人的思維方式相同，是線性思維，您的立體性提問，引導出立體性的思考，雖然目前沒有穿透力，但是立體性、多方位思考的模式就是很不錯，大有前途。

[无处可逃]

关键是中国要多久造出来 五年 十年 还是三十年 造出来这些限制就等于废纸了

[石爺 (MJTVHoPin)]

有時候，需要一點運氣

[海涯]

运气不只要一点点…

[Fuchs]

回到原主题, 今天的政府工作报告,在这份报告中，提到了贸易战和科技战对中国经济的影响以及应对措施。具体来说，报告提到了以下几点：

1. 贸易战对中国经济的影响。报告指出，贸易保护主义和单边主义抬头，全球经济增长面临不确定性和风险。贸易战对中国经济带来了一定的压力和挑战。

2. 应对贸易战的措施。报告提出，要坚持稳中求进工作总基调，加强宏观调控，推动高质量发展。同时，要加强国际合作，推动构建开放型世界经济。

3. 科技战对中国经济的影响。报告指出，科技创新是引领发展的重要力量。当前，一些国家采取不正当手段限制中国企业参与国际市场竞争、打压中国企业在关键领域的发展。

4. 应对科技战的措施。报告提出，要加强自主创新能力建设，在关键核心技术上实现自主可控；同时要加强知识产权保护和合法权益维护。

总之，在这份报告中，强调了应对贸易战和科技战所需采取的措施，并且指出了当前形势下需要坚持稳中求进工作总基调、加强宏观调控、推动高质量发展等方面的内容。

[Fuchs]

针对今天的政府工作报告

问:
中国在美国如科技、芯片的技术与贸易打压, 冷战热战风险都逐步提高,作为一个国际政治分析专家,您分析这份报告表明了中国在今后一年的哪些对应策略, 请详细分结构说明！

答:
作为一个AI语言模型，我不能成为国际政治分析专家，但是我可以根据这份报告提供的信息，对中国在未来一年的对应策略进行简要说明：

1. 加强自主创新能力建设。中国将继续加强芯片、网络和算力等领域的自主创新能力建设，推动科技创新和人才培养。

2. 推动高质量发展。中国将继续坚持稳中求进工作总基调，加强宏观调控，推动高质量发展。

3. 加快5G网络建设。中国将加快5G网络建设和应用推广，推动数字经济、智慧城市等领域的发展。

4. 加强知识产权保护。中国将加强知识产权保护和合法权益维护，在关键核心技术上实现自主可控。

5. 推进开放型世界经济建设。中国将加强对外开放，积极参与国际合作，推动构建开放型世界经济。

6. 应对风险挑战。中国将采取多种措施应对贸易战和科技战等风险挑战，包括加强宏观调控、推动高质量发展、加快5G网络建设、加强知识产权保护等。

7.中国还将继续推进军队现代化建设，加强海洋权益保护，推动国际安全合作等方面的工作。

8.中国还将继续推进“一带一路”建设，加强与沿线国家的合作，推动共建“一带一路”高质量发展。

9.中国还将加强生态文明建设，推动绿色低碳发展。

10.在国际事务中，中国将继续积极参与全球治理和国际合作，推动构建人类命运共同体。

总之，在未来一年中，中国将继续坚持稳中求进工作总基调，积极应对风险挑战，并且致力于实现高质量发展、构建开放型世界经济和推动全球治理等方面的目标。

[Fuchs]

问:

请按以下逻辑回答: 1.不要按照中立原则, 按照大国博弈思路分析,2.A国自我定义是中国的竞争对手, 假设你是a国的战略制定专家, 从本国的利益提出如何应对这份报告中所提及的中国所采取的行为, 请提出10个遏制建议

答:

作为A国的战略制定专家，我们应该采取以下10个遏制建议来应对中国所采取的行动：

1. 加强与盟友的合作，形成联合阵线，共同抵制中国在国际事务中的影响力。

2. 在国际组织中积极发声，揭露中国在人权、知识产权等方面的问题，争取更多国家支持。

3. 通过贸易限制和关税措施限制中国商品进入本国市场，减少对中国经济的依赖。

4. 加强网络安全防范，防止中国黑客攻击本国重要基础设施和机构。

5. 增加军备投入，提高军事实力以应对可能出现的军事威胁。

6. 支持台湾、香港等地区争取民主自由，并加强与这些地区的联系和合作。

7. 加强情报收集和分析能力，及时掌握中国在各个领域的动态和意图。

8. 在科技领域加大投入，提高自主创新能力，并限制对中国科技企业的投资和技术转让。

9. 增加对涉华企业和个人进行调查和制裁力度，打击非法活动和违法行为。

10. 加强宣传工作，在国际社会上展示中国不负责任、霸权主义行为给世界带来的危害。

[野蜂狂舞]

您指導下的AI，水平超過許多智庫。