北京完善金融武器库,俄乌战争给中国上了一课|外交事务

  • 2022年俄罗斯入侵乌克兰时,中国试图平衡两种利益:加强他们与俄罗斯的关系,避免西方的制裁。中国拒绝向俄罗斯出售武器和规避制裁,并赞同莫斯科的冲突理由,同时利用俄罗斯打折的石油和加强经济联系。

  • 中国正在这些相互竞争的目标之间进行 “北京跨度”,并从西方主导的对俄制裁运动中吸取了重要的经验教训。他们目睹了华盛顿磨练和部署经济武器,如制裁、出口控制、投资限制和关税,而乌克兰冲突给了他们一个研究西方制裁联盟的战略、战术和能力的机会。

  • 中国知道,如果与西方的紧张局势继续加剧,这些同样的经济武器可能会被用来对付他们,他们在平衡俄罗斯和西方的利益时已经考虑到了这一点。

  • 西方对俄罗斯的制裁努力包括立即和长期的措施,如资产冻结、出口管制、限制开发深水、北极和页岩资源。

  • 中国已经从制裁中吸收了某些关键的经验教训,其中之一就是国际伙伴关系的力量。

  • 制裁也提醒中国政府,违反国际准则或藐视国际法的国家可能会有什么后果。

  • 中国历来批评其他国家发起的制裁,声称联合国安理会拥有实施制裁的唯一合法性。

  • 尽管如此,中国还是悄悄地利用其经济实力来惩罚与它意见相左的国家,并经常以 "公共卫生 "或环境为由为其行动辩护。

  • 这方面的例子包括中国对中国异议人士刘晓波获得诺贝尔和平奖以及达赖喇嘛访问蒙古的回应。

  • 中国还利用经济措施来惩罚其他国家的某些政策,包括菲律宾在南中国海主张海洋权益和韩国部署美国的导弹防御系统。

  • 这些措施给目标国家造成了巨大的损失,例如,由于中国的行动,韩国估计损失了51亿美元的收入。

  • 中国这些行动的非正式性质使它可以在没有任何解释的情况下拨高或拨低。

  • 中国的目的是惩罚其他国家的某些政策,阻止未来对中国不利的选择和行为,同时仍公开声称单边强制经济措施在国际体系中没有地位。

  • 中国在过去三年中接受了单边经济措施,如资产冻结和签证禁令,不可靠实体名单,以及2020年的香港国家安全法。

  • 其最全面的回应是2021年6月通过的反外国制裁法,该法允许中国政府对公司和个人的广泛的定义模糊的行为采取反措施。

  • 北京的经济武器库现在已经完成了,它拥有全套的单边制裁和控制措施,它仍然声称是非法的。

  • 2022年2月俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后,西方国家立即采取了全面的经济制裁措施,包括冻结资产、制裁金融机构以及切断其对安全信息传递平台SWIFT的访问。

  • 这是自二战以来对一个经济体最大的惩罚性回应,因为按国内生产总值计算,俄罗斯是世界上第十大经济体,每天生产1100万桶石油,并且是全球关键商品和投入的主要供应商。

  • 俄罗斯和中国都拥有核武器,是联合国安理会和其他全球机构的成员。

  • 中国的经济规模是俄罗斯的十倍,与美国的关系更为密切。

  • 过去一年的事件让中国的决策者们感到不安,因为看起来即使是一线经济体也不至于被制裁。

  • 北京对西方国家对俄罗斯侵略行为的强烈反应感到惊讶。

  • 西方已经表明,它愿意为乌克兰等国家承担相当大的风险,包括经济冲击。

  • 中国不能再认为西方只会对边缘国家实施重大制裁,对主要国家实施边缘制裁。

  • 在2014年顿巴斯入侵事件发生后,中国和俄罗斯认为西方不会支持代表第三方的昂贵制裁。

  • 这一次,西方迅速采取行动进行制裁,甚至对俄罗斯的石油和天然气出口也进行了制裁,而这在以前被认为是太重要了,不能碰。

  • 西方已经承担了成本,如通货膨胀和更高的能源费用,但联盟至今仍在坚持。

  • 北京的教训很明显:对国际秩序的重大威胁会导致痛苦的经济反应,甚至会让实施制裁的国家付出代价。

  • 中国不会避免对台湾使用武力,因为领导人正在权衡侵略的成本和收益。

  • 自2014-15年以来,俄罗斯试图对其经济进行 “制裁证明”,建立外汇储备,减少美元持有量,引入米尔信用卡系统和SWIFT的替代品。

  • 俄罗斯 "制裁证明 "其经济的尝试并不成功,因为当各辖区加入制裁努力时,外汇储备被冻结,黄金持有量被固定。

  • 米尔信用卡系统在亚洲获得了一些中型银行的合作伙伴,但当美国财政部宣布它们将被视为规避西方制裁时,各银行切断了联系。

  • 金融信息传输系统是SWIFT的替代方案,覆盖范围有限,比SWIFT更繁琐,安全性更低。

  • 中国将尝试从俄罗斯的制裁经验中吸收教训,以堵塞漏洞,保证复原力,并创造更多的选择。

  • 俄罗斯试图对其经济进行 "制裁证明 "的努力并不成功,因为外汇储备被冻结,黄金持有量被冻结,米尔信用卡系统和SWIFT的替代品都取得了有限的成功。

  • 中国已将其外汇储备中以美元持有的部分从1995年的79%降至2016年的59%。

  • 中国已经推出了自己的人民币支付系统–跨境银行支付系统。

  • 在开发西方平台、协议和机构的变通方法和替代方案方面,中国比任何其他国家都有更多的筹码。

  • 中国真正的美元持有量是未知的,可能并没有减少报告的数额。

  • 中国的替代方案是有限的,因为它不能将其任何外汇储备转为人民币。

  • 中国要说服世界上的发达经济体将全球金融流动委托给中国管理的平台,将是困难的,甚至是不可能的。

  • 中国正在加班加点地开发西方平台、协议和机构的变通办法和替代方案。

  • 北京正面临着经济和地缘政治的现实,不允许它颠覆全球金融体系。

  • 目前还不清楚中国能在哪里取代美元和欧元成为主导性的国际货币。

  • 对俄罗斯的制裁由于是与其他国家联合进行的,因此更有说服力。

  • 中国没有相应的联盟,使他们容易受到广泛、一致的制裁。

  • 当中国把澳大利亚和立陶宛作为目标时,他们已经看到了其进攻性经济武器的局限性。

  • 北京正在努力重建关系,接待外国领导人,并进行商业交易,以使任何潜在的美国反华联盟复杂化。

  • 北京和华盛顿的收获是,在与中国的任何潜在对抗中,国际伙伴关系的重要性。

  • 美国经济武器库中最有价值的武器是其国际伙伴关系的力量。

  • China attempted to balance two interests when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022: bolstering their entente with Russia and avoiding sanctions from the West. China has refused to sell arms to Russia and circumvent sanctions, and has endorsed Moscow’s rationales for the conflict while taking advantage of discounted Russian oil and enhancing economic linkages.

  • China is performing the “Beijing straddle” between these competing objectives and has learned important lessons from the Western-led sanctions campaign on Russia. They have watched Washington hone and deploy economic weapons such as sanctions, export controls, investment restrictions, and tariffs, and the Ukraine conflict has given them an opportunity to study the strategy, tactics, and capabilities of a Western sanctions coalition.

  • China knows that if tensions with the West continue to intensify, these same economic weapons may be used against them, and they have taken this into account while balancing their interests between Russia and the West.

  • The Western sanctions effort against Russia includes both immediate and long-term measures such as asset freezes, export controls, and restrictions on development of deep-water, Arctic, and shale resources.

  • China has already absorbed certain key lessons from the sanctions, one of which is the power of international partnerships.

  • The sanctions also serve as a reminder to Beijing of the potential consequences for countries that go against international norms or flout international law.

  • China has historically criticized sanctions launched by other countries, claiming the UN Security Council has the only legitimacy to impose them.

  • Despite this, China has quietly used its economic might to punish countries with which it disagrees with, often by justifying action on “public health” or environmental grounds.

  • Examples of this include China’s response to the Nobel Peace Prize win of Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo and the Dalai Lama’s visit to Mongolia.

  • China has also used economic measures to punish certain policies of other countries, including the Philippines’ assertion of maritime claims in the South China Sea and South Korea’s deployment of a U.S. missile defense system.

  • These measures have caused significant losses for the targeted countries, such as South Korea losing an estimated $5.1 billion in revenues as a result of China’s actions.

  • China’s informal nature of these actions allows it to dial them up or down without any explanation.

  • Beijing aims to punish certain policies by other countries and discourage future choices and behaviors that would disadvantage China, while still publicly claiming that unilateral coercive economic measures have no place in the international system.

  • China has embraced unilateral economic measures in the last three years, such as asset freezes and visa bans, an Unreliable Entities List, and a 2020 Hong Kong national security law.

  • Its most sweeping response was the anti–foreign sanctions law passed in June 2021, which allows the Chinese government to apply countermeasures to companies and individuals for a broad range of vaguely defined actions.

  • Beijing’s economic arsenal is now complete, with a full complement of the unilateral sanctions and controls it still claims are unlawful.

  • The West responded to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 with immediate, all-out economic sanctions, including asset freezes, sanctions on financial institutions, and the severing of their access to the secure messaging platform SWIFT.

  • This was the largest punitive response to an economy since World War II, as Russia had the world’s tenth largest economy by GDP, 11 million barrels of oil production per day, and was the leading supplier of key global goods and inputs.

  • Russia and China both have nuclear weapons and are members of the UN Security Council and other global institutions.

  • China’s economy is ten times larger than Russia’s, with much stronger ties to the US.

  • The events of the past year have been disconcerting to Chinese decision-makers, as it appears that even a first-tier economy is not too big to sanction.

  • Beijing has been surprised by the strong response from the West to Russia’s aggression.

  • The West has shown that it is willing to take on considerable risks, including economic shocks, for countries like Ukraine.

  • China can no longer assume that the West will only impose major sanctions on marginal countries and marginal sanctions on major countries.

  • In the wake of the 2014 Donbas invasion, China and Russia thought the West would not support costly sanctions on behalf of a third party.

  • This time, the West has moved quickly to impose sanctions, even on Russia’s oil and gas exports, which were previously seen as too important to touch.

  • The West has taken on costs, such as inflation and higher energy bills, but the coalition has held so far.

  • The lesson for Beijing is clear: a major threat to international order can result in a painful economic response, even with costs for the countries imposing the sanctions.

  • China will not avoid using force against Taiwan, as leaders weigh costs and benefits of aggression.

  • Russia has attempted to “sanctions proof” its economy since 2014-15, building up foreign currency reserves, reducing dollar holdings, introducing Mir credit card system and alternative to SWIFT.

  • Russia’s attempt to “sanctions proof” its economy was not successful, as foreign currency reserves were frozen and gold holdings immobilized when jurisdictions joined the sanctions effort.

  • Mir credit card system had secured a few medium-sized bank partners in Asia, but banks severed ties when U.S. Treasury announced they would be viewed as circumventing Western sanctions.

  • System for Transfer of Financial Messages, alternative to SWIFT, had limited reach, was more cumbersome and less secure than SWIFT.

  • China will attempt to absorb lessons from Russia’s experience with sanctions in order to plug vulnerabilities, assure resilience, and create more options.

  • Russia’s attempt to “sanctions proof” its economy was not successful, as foreign currency reserves were frozen, gold holdings immobilized, and Mir credit card system and alternative to SWIFT both had limited success.

  • China has reduced the portion of its foreign reserves held in US dollars from 79% in 1995 to 59% in 2016.

  • China has rolled out its own renminbi payment system, the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System.

  • China has more leverage than any other nation to develop workarounds and alternatives to Western platforms, protocols, and institutions.

  • China’s true US dollar holdings are unknown and may not have decreased by the reported amount.

  • China’s alternatives are limited as it cannot move any of its foreign reserves into renminbi.

  • It will be difficult, perhaps even impossible, for China to convince the world’s advanced economies to entrust global financial flows to a Chinese-run platform.

  • China is working overtime to develop workarounds and alternatives to Western platforms, protocols, and institutions.

  • Beijing is bumping up against economic and geopolitical realities that will not allow it to subvert the global financial system.

  • It is not clear where China can go to replace the dollar and the euro as the dominant international currency.

  • Sanctions on Russia had much more bite due to being a joint effort with other countries.

  • China does not have a corresponding coalition, making them vulnerable to broad, concerted sanctions.

  • China has already seen the limitations of their offensive economic weapons when they targeted Australia and Lithuania.

  • Beijing is working to rebuild relationships, host foreign leaders, and make business deals in order to complicate any potential American counter-China coalition.

  • The takeaway for both Beijing and Washington is the importance of international partnerships in any potential confrontation with China.

  • The most valuable weapon in America’s economic arsenal is the strength of its international partnerships.

链接: What China Has Learned From the Ukraine War