习近平的权力攫取正在取得回报|外交事务

  • 直到最近,习近平还被视为一股不可动摇的力量,但广泛的抗议和他的COVID政策的逆转改变了这一点。

  • 中国共产党第二十次全国代表大会是中国政治的一个分水岭,习近平第三次当选,他的盟友占据了政治局常委和政治局委员。

  • 习近平在大会开幕式上的报告概述了他对国家未来的愿景,强调政治控制、经济国家主义和全球影响力。

  • 挑选出一个完全与习近平结盟的人民委员会和政治局是出乎意料的,因为大多数分析家认为其他派别的一些高级领导人和温和派会被保留下来。

  • 党章还增加了一项修正案,规定要忠于习近平的领导。

  • 这显示了习近平对人员、程序和机构的操纵,以最大限度地提高其终身统治的能力。

  • 尽管目前存在政策失误和经济逆风,但习近平通过党的第二十次代表大会在加强其地位方面取得的进展使他拥有强大的政治基础。

  • 这可以帮助他克服任何对其权威的外部和内部威胁。

  • 所有这些都表明,习近平仍然是中国政治中一支强大的力量。

  • 在最近的中共大会和全会上,习近平以前所未有的姿态出现在党内。他横扫了政治局常委的所有7个职位,并将他在24名政治局委员中的忠臣比例提高到80%以上。他对党内高层机构遴选过程的控制使他能够任命盟友担任关键职位。

  • 大会前的程序涉及与高级干部的 “谈话和调查”,将 “政治标准放在首位”,并促进习近平领导的 “坚定支持者”。这一次,习近平只面试了30名领导人,没有与党内长者或没有党内最高职位的国家政府领导人协商。

  • 遴选过程和最终的任命表明了对党的领导机构的重视,以及与前领导人江泽民和胡锦涛相联系的旧派系网络的政治弱点。习近平现在对中国共产党的控制力是前所未有的。

  • 习近平的 "最大限度的习 "新时代提高了政治风险,因为他对政策制定的强大影响力可能导致方向的突然转变。

  • 与他们的前任相比,习近平的忠臣在国家或省级领导岗位上的经验较少。

  • 习近平更强的控制力可能会导致更好的政策执行,但这取决于他的政策质量,这些政策似乎致力于他长期的政治议程。

  • 中国目前正面临着从频繁的COVID封锁过渡到病毒在人群中蔓延的艰巨任务。北京正在采取建设性的努力来减少对经济的压力。如果增长率恢复到COVID之前的水平,而且华盛顿没有什么动力采取较少的对抗性策略,那么习近平很可能会重新采取干预性更强的监管政策和更加自信的外交政策。

  • 习近平认为,通过斗争寻求安全会导致生存,而通过妥协寻求安全会导致死亡。他还认为,通过斗争寻求发展会导致繁荣,而通过妥协寻求发展则会导致衰退。

  • 由于COVID大流行,中国正面临着一个困难时期,中国政府正在采取措施,以减少经济的压力。习近平认为,通过斗争寻求安全和发展是成功的最佳途径,而妥协将导致衰退。如果增长率恢复到COVID之前的水平,他可能会重新采取更多的干预性监管政策和更强硬的外交政策。

  • 中央委员会是中国共产党的 “最高领导机构”,有权对重大国家政策做出决定。由376名成员组成的新的第二十届中央委员会包括205名正式成员和171名无投票权的候补成员。习近平 "亲自指导 "中央委员会的选拔工作。

  • 65.4%的更替率远远高于2012年的48.9%和2007年的49.3%,也就是习近平领导之前的比率。成员的平均年龄也从2017年的57岁和2012年的56.1岁上升到57.2岁。

  • 中央委员会是中共的 “最高领导机构”。

  • 习近平 "亲自指导 "中央委员会的选拔工作。

  • 离职率为65.4%,比习近平领导之前高得多。

  • 成员的平均年龄上升到57.2岁。

  • 习近平提拔没有经验的盟友担任高层职位,培养政策专家的政治忠诚度。他选择了有史以来受教育程度最高的委员会,其中49.5%是技术官僚,7.7%是科技、数学和工程学学者。女性代表增加到8.8%,但少数民族代表下降到8.5%。

  • 优先考虑那些专注于扶贫、跨区域发展、环境保护、应对美国领导的制裁和克服技术障碍,以及坚持党的领导和升级价值链的官员。

  • 希望在习近平的中国取得进步的干部应该优先考虑这些目标,以获得最大的成功机会。

  • 中国共产党(CCP)有自己的宪法,不同于中华人民共和国的国家宪法。

  • 这部宪法概述了中国共产党的原则、活动和结构,并提供了一个党内法规体系。

  • 习近平正在扩大和改写这一制度,以提高他治理党和国家的能力。

  • 去年对党章的修订加强了习近平的个人统治。

  • 党员现在有义务执行 “两个维护”:支持习近平在党中央的核心地位,支持中央委员会的权威和统一领导。

  • 这一授权是习近平在巩固其地位方面的进一步举措,他正式将反对他的领导与反对党本身等同起来。

  • 党代会召开前,确立习近平为党的核心、习近平思想为指导地位的 "两个确立 "占据了主导地位,但这些并没有进入党的最新宪法。

  • 党的观察家们正在寻找能够将习近平与毛泽东相提并论的短语,如 “习近平思想”、"人民领袖 "和 “掌舵人”,但这些都没有被纳入。

  • 有些人认为这显示了对习近平领导力的抵制,但现在得出这个结论还为时过早。

  • 党的二十大秘书处一位匿名领导干部的问答解释说,"两个坚持 "将帮助成员理解 "两个确立 "的意义。

  • 习近平可能没有被奉为宪法中的 “人民领袖”,因为他本人可能认为将自己等同于毛泽东是不合适的。

  • 向党的二十大提交的政治报告是对党的当前世界观和政策重点的权威陈述。

  • 它预示着习近平个人领导力和政策议程的连续性,并表明习近平将继续推动中国向更威权、国家主义和民族主义方向发展。

  • 中国经济将有更强的党的作用,在主要企业中占有董事会席位,并引导资本流向受青睐的行业。

  • 政治报告将 "系统思维 "作为习近平意识形态的一部分,经济、政治和社会改革需要调整利益平衡。

  • 中国日益复杂的政策问题需要加强党的监督和更多的政府系统来管理国家发展的所有方面。

  • 总的来说,向党的二十大提交的政治报告预示着习近平的个人领导和政策议程的连续性,中国经济具有更强的党的作用,"系统思维 "被引入习近平的意识形态中。

  • 这表明,在未来几年甚至几十年里,习近平将继续推动中国向更加威权、国家主义和民族主义方向发展。

  • 习近平希望加强党的控制,以应对越来越多的威胁。

  • 中国目前正处于 "战略机遇与风险和挑战并存 "的时期。

  • 有必要为突发危机和可预见的威胁做好准备。

  • 2022年的政治报告中有一个专门讨论国家安全的新章节。

  • 习近平的报告呼吁加强党的领导,实行以人为本的决策,发扬奋斗精神。

  • 报告重点关注科学、教育和人力资本,以加强国内创新。

  • 该报告旨在平衡经济增长和国家安全。

  • 它试图解决生产力增长滞后和西方对关键技术的扼制所带来的政治风险。

  • 这份报告旨在帮助中国成为一个全球超级大国。

  • 习近平的报告确定了新的增长动力–人工智能、信息技术、生物技术、绿色产业、高端制造业、可再生能源和新型工业材料,但对市场、开放和供应方结构改革的热情明显不足。

  • 该党的任务是 “高质量发展”,包括促进国内需求和本土技术,同时提高全球对中国供应链的依赖性。

  • 党还在扩大对私营部门的监督,在非国有企业中 “加强党建”,并 "改善 "金融企业和私人财富的 “公司治理”。

  • 该报告正在为中国与美国的长期战略竞争做准备。

  • 习近平希望中国在2049年人民共和国成立一百周年时 “在综合国力和国际影响力方面领先于世界”。

  • 该党的目标是在本世纪中期实现 “现代化”,并拒绝民主政治、个人自由和美国在全球治理中的领导地位。

  • 一个新的说法–“解决台湾问题要由中国人民自己来决定”–意味着对美国和盟国支持台湾的努力进行更坚定的回击。

  • 中国将 "积极参与 "全球人权治理和全球安全规则的制定。

  • 该报告没有改变台湾政策,但暗示未来将采取更坚定的立场。

  • 党代会最戏剧性的时刻是前领导人胡锦涛的退出。人们猜测他是被强行赶走或受到羞辱,但没有找到证实。

  • 新华社的英文推特账户说,胡锦涛 “感觉不舒服”,“去了会场旁边的一个房间休息”。胡锦涛再次出现在一个仪式上,并出现在一份退休同志的名单上,这表明退出不是一次精心策划的清洗。

  • 目前还不清楚发生了什么事;在没有可靠信息的情况下,只能做出有根据的猜测。胡锦涛的年龄和已知的体弱多病使得健康事件有可能发生,但习近平对控制、感知和控制的痴迷,使他无法控制自己。

  • 习近平的第三个任期和拒绝指定政治继承人表明他可能打算终身执政。

  • 他在党的二十大上巩固了权力,这表明他有这样做的政治资本。

  • 他将自己与毛泽东在1945年巩固权力的做法作了比较。

  • 习近平的继任对中国来说是一种 "灰犀牛 "式的政治风险:不知道何时、如何、以及接下来会发生什么。

  • 盟友可能会开始争夺继承权,导致政策混乱,经济停滞,甚至政治混乱。

  • 习近平拒绝指定政治继承人,表明他可能打算终身执政。

  • 他在党的二十大上巩固了权力,这表明他有足够的政治资本这样做。

  • 他的继任对中国来说是一种 "灰犀牛 "式的政治风险,有可能造成政策混乱、经济停滞,甚至政治混乱。

  • Xi Jinping was seen as an unassailable force until recently, but widespread protests and a reversal of his COVID policy have changed that.

  • The 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was a watershed event for Chinese politics, with Xi being elected for a third term and his allies occupying the Politburo Standing Committee and Politburo.

  • Xi’s report to the opening session of the Congress outlined his vision for the country’s future, with an emphasis on political control, economic statism, and global influence.

  • The selection of a completely Xi-allied PSC and Politburo was unexpected, as most analysts assumed some senior leaders and moderates from other factions would be retained.

  • An amendment to the party’s constitution was also added, mandating loyalty to Xi’s leadership.

  • This shows Xi’s maneuvering of people, processes, and institutions to maximize his ability to rule for life.

  • Despite current policy errors and economic headwinds, Xi’s progress in strengthening his position through the 20th Party Congress gives him a strong political base.

  • This could help him overcome any external and internal threats to his authority.

  • All of this suggests Xi remains a formidable force in Chinese politics.

  • At the recent CCP Congress and plenum, Xi Jinping emerged with an unprecedented grip on the party. He swept all seven positions on the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), and increased his majority of loyalists on the 24-member Politburo to over 80%. His control of selection processes for top party bodies has enabled him to appoint allies to key positions.

  • The pre-Congress process involved “conversation and investigation” with senior cadres, putting “political standards first” and promoting “firm supporters” of Xi’s leadership. This time, Xi only interviewed 30 leaders, not consulting with party elders or national government leaders without top party positions.

  • The selection process and resulting appointments demonstrate the importance placed on party leadership bodies and political weakness of old factional networks tied to ex-leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Xi Jinping now has an unprecedented grip on the Chinese Communist Party.

  • Xi Jinping broke many political norms in order to gain power and dominance, including not following the retirement age of 68, keeping Zhang Youxia and Wang Yi in their positions, and forcing Li Keqiang and Wang Yang to retire early.

  • Hu Chunhua, the last senior leader associated with the Communist Youth League, was demoted, ending any power sharing norms.

  • The incoming Politburo was the first since 1992 without a single female member.

  • Xi prioritizes political loyalty over norms, governance experience, and policy expertise.

  • Li Qiang was elevated to premier in March, despite not having any prior central government experience.

  • Some optimists say he is pro-business, but this was said of Xi a decade ago too.

  • Xi has broken many norms to gain power and dominance, prioritizing political loyalty over other factors.

  • Li Qiang was appointed premier without any experience in the central government.

  • Optimists believe he is pro-business, though this was said of Xi too.

  • Xi’s new era of “maximum Xi” heightens political risk due to his powerful influence on policymaking, which can lead to sudden shifts in direction.

  • Xi’s loyalists have less experience in national or provincial leadership roles than their predecessors.

  • Xi’s stronger control could lead to better policy implementation, but it is dependent on the quality of his policies, which appear to be committed to his long-standing political agenda.

  • China is currently facing the difficult task of transitioning from frequent COVID lockdowns to the virus spreading throughout the population. Beijing is taking constructive efforts to reduce pressures on the economy. If growth rate recovers to pre-COVID levels and there is little incentive from Washington to adopt less confrontational tactics, Xi Jinping is likely to return to a more interventionist regulatory policy and a more assertive foreign policy.

  • Xi Jinping believes that seeking security through struggle leads to survival, while seeking security through compromise leads to death. He also believes that seeking development through struggle leads to flourishing, while seeking development through compromise leads to decline.

  • China is facing a difficult time due to the COVID pandemic and Beijing is taking steps to reduce pressures on the economy. Xi Jinping believes that seeking security and development through struggle is the best way to succeed, while compromise will lead to decline. He is likely to return to a more interventionist regulatory policy and a more assertive foreign policy if the growth rate recovers to pre-COVID levels.

  • The Central Committee is the CCP’s “highest leading body” with the power to make decisions on major national policies. The new 376-member 20th Central Committee includes 205 full members and 171 non-voting alternate members. Xi “personally directed the gatekeeping” of selections to the Central Committee.

  • The turnover rate of 65.4 percent is much higher than rates of 48.9 percent in 2012 and 49.3 percent in 2007, before Xi’s leadership. The average age of members also inched up to 57.2 years old from 57 in 2017 and 56.1 in 2012.

  • The Central Committee is the CCP’s “highest leading body”.

  • Xi “personally directed the gatekeeping” of selections to the Central Committee.

  • Turnover rate of 65.4 percent is much higher than before Xi’s leadership.

  • Average age of members inched up to 57.2 years old.

  • Xi Jinping promoted inexperienced allies to top positions and cultivated political loyalty of policy experts. He selected the most educated committee ever, with 49.5% technocrats and 7.7% STEM scholars. Female representation increased to 8.8%, but ethnic minority representation fell to 8.5%.

  • Preference was given to officials who had focused on poverty alleviation, cross-regional development, environmental protection, responding to US-led sanctions and overcoming tech chokepoints, and upholding party leadership and upgrading value chains.

  • Cadres wishing to advance in Xi’s China should prioritize these objectives to have the best chance at success.

  • The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has its own constitution distinct from the state constitution of the People’s Republic of China.

  • This constitution outlines the CCP’s principles, activities, and structures and provides a system of intraparty regulations.

  • Xi Jinping is expanding and rewriting the system to improve his ability to govern the party and the country.

  • Last year’s amendments to the party constitution strengthened Xi’s personal rule.

  • Party members are now obliged to implement the “two upholds”: support for Xi’s core position in the Party Central Committee and support for the Central Committee’s authority and unified leadership.

  • This mandate is a further step by Xi in entrenching his position by formally equating opposition to his leadership with opposition to the party itself.

  • The lead-up to the Party Congress was dominated by the “two establishments” of establishing Xi as the party’s core and his thought as the guiding position, but these did not make it into the party’s updated constitution.

  • Party watchers were looking for phrases that would place Xi on par with Mao, such as “Xi Jinping Thought”, “people’s leader”, and “helmsman”, but none of these were included.

  • Some believe this shows resistance to Xi’s leadership, but it is premature to draw this conclusion.

  • The Q&A with an anonymous leading cadre from the 20th Party Congress secretariat explains that the “two upholds” will help members understand the significance of the “two establishments”.

  • Xi may not have been enshrined as the “people’s leader” in the constitution because he himself may believe it inappropriate to equate himself with Mao.

  • Paragraph 1:

  • The political report to the 20th Party Congress is an authoritative statement of the party’s current worldview and policy priorities.

  • It signals continuity in Xi’s personal leadership and policy agenda and suggests that Xi will keep pushing China in a more authoritarian, statist, and nationalist direction.

  • The Chinese economy will have a stronger party role, with board seats in major firms and guiding capital towards favored sectors.

  • The political report introduced “systems thinking” as part of Xi’s ideology, with economic, political, and social reforms requiring adjustment of a balance of interests.

  • China’s increasingly complex policy issues need enhanced party oversight and more government systems to manage all aspects of the country’s development.

  • Overall, the political report to the 20th Party Congress signals continuity in Xi’s personal leadership and policy agenda, with the Chinese economy having a stronger party role and “systems thinking” being introduced as part of Xi’s ideology.

  • This suggests that Xi will continue to push China in a more authoritarian, statist, and nationalist direction in the coming years and even decades.

  • Xi Jinping wants to increase party control to counter increasing threats.

  • China is now in a period of “strategic opportunity coexisting with risks and challenges”.

  • There is a need to prepare for both unexpected crises and foreseeable threats.

  • The 2022 political report contains a new section devoted to national security.

  • Xi’s report calls for stronger party leadership, people-centered policymaking, and a spirit of struggle.

  • There is a focus on science, education, and human capital to bolster domestic innovation.

  • The report aims to balance economic growth with national security.

  • It seeks to address the political risks of lagging productivity growth and Western chokeholds on key technologies.

  • This report is intended to help China become a global superpower.

  • Xi Jinping’s report identified new growth drivers—AI, IT, biotech, green industries, high-end manufacturing, renewable energy, and new industrial materials—but was notably less enthusiastic about markets, openness, and supply-side structural reform.

  • The party is tasked with “high-quality development”, which includes boosting domestic demand and homegrown technology while increasing global reliance on Chinese supply chains.

  • The party is also expanding oversight of the private sector by “strengthening party building” in non-state firms and “improving corporate governance” of financial firms and of private wealth.

  • The report is preparing China for long-term strategic competition with the United States.

  • Xi wants China to “lead the world in comprehensive national power and international influence” by the centenary of the people’s republic in 2049.

  • The party is aiming to achieve “modernization” by mid-century and reject democratic politics, individual freedoms, and U.S. leadership in global governance.

  • A new phrase—“resolving the Taiwan question is for the Chinese people themselves to decide”—portends more assertive pushback against U.S. and allied efforts to support Taiwan.

  • China will “actively participate” in global human rights governance and the formulation of global security rules.

  • The report did not change Taiwan policy, but suggests a more assertive stance in the future.

  • The most dramatic moment of the Party Congress was the exit of former leader Hu Jintao. Speculation was that he was forcibly removed or humiliated, but no confirmation has been found.

  • Xinhua’s English-language Twitter account said Hu “was not feeling well” and went “to a room next to the meeting venue for a rest.” Hu’s reappearance at a ceremony and presence on a list of retired comrades suggest the exit was not an orchestrated purge.

  • It is unclear what happened; educated guesses are made in the absence of reliable information. Hu’s age and known infirmity make a health event plausible, but Xi’s obsession with control, perception, and process makes it unlikely that he planned a disruptive display of disunity.

  • Xi Jinping’s third term and refusal to anoint a political heir suggest he may plan to rule for life.

  • His consolidation of power at the 20th Party Congress suggests he has the political capital to do so.

  • He drew a parallel between himself and Mao Zedong’s consolidation of power in 1945.

  • Xi’s succession is a “gray rhino” political risk for China: unknown when, how, and what comes next.

  • Allies may begin jockeying for succession, leading to policy confusion, economic stasis, or even political chaos.

  • Xi’s refusal to anoint a political heir suggests he may plan to rule for life.

  • His consolidation of power at the 20th Party Congress suggests he has the political capital to do so.

  • His succession is a “gray rhino” political risk for China, with potential for policy confusion, economic stasis, or even political chaos.

链接:Xi Jinping's Grip on Power in China Is Still Strong

1 个赞